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COLUMBUS, Ga. — Two nights ago, there were a mere eleven total officers patrolling the city’s 26 total police beats from 10 p.m. until 6 a.m. There should be between 45 and 50 officers on patrol. Instead, there were eleven; fifteen fewer officers than there are beats to patrol.
Another officer has also resigned from the Columbus Police Department, bringing the number of resignations since Jensen Hughes’ presentation on Feb. 14, 2023 up to seven, and the total resignations up to twelve since the beginning of this year just seven weeks ago.
This is the fifth article of a six-part series by Muscogee Muckraker covering the four Columbus Police Department documents we leaked in part one. If you’re new to the topics covered in this series, you can get caught up through our previous works here.
In the absence of leadership from city officials, a private group of local community leaders took the initiative to have a world-class study performed on the entire Columbus Police Department — and they paid for the $190,000 study out of their own pockets.
Before we continue, the reader must understand the absolute insanity of it requiring a group of private individuals to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to overcome the purposeful, negligent, ignorant, and racist actions of their city’s elected officials. Let us be absolutely clear: the only reason the Jensen Hughes study was able to force the attention of our city’s elected officials was because those same officials continuously chose to ignore the problem for years, despite three former studies having already brought it to their joint attention. It is absolutely imperative that the reader understand this key chain of negligence.
The word leadership is mentioned throughout the Jensen Hughes report a total of 61 times. One of those instances was in the table of contents and one was in its cover letter. That leaves a total of 59 instances of the word leadership appearing elsewhere throughout the report.
Only one section of the report is dedicated to assessing the department’s leadership, which begins on page 27 of the report. The word is used 11 times within that section. That means the word leadership is used 48 additional times throughout the entirety of the report in all of its various sections.
Let’s take a minute to appreciate what that means.
That means that 48 other additional internal problems of the Columbus Police Department have been identified by none other than Jensen Hughes to be connected, traced, or directly caused by its leadership.
Forty-eight.
Without further adieu, here’s the Operational Assessment of the Columbus Police Department with our contextual highlighting of all instances of the word leadership below.
JENSEN HUGHES OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COLUMBUS, GA POLICE DEPARTMENT; ORIGINAL DRAFT REPORT (11/11/2022)
THE COVER LETTER
The first instance of the word leadership appears in the document’s cover letter, smack in the middle of the second line of the very first introductory paragraph. Right off-the-bat, Jensen Hughes made it quite clear that leadership is the absolute crux of the department’s core problems, saying:
“This report provides findings and recommendations designed to improve the Columbus Police Department, address leadership issues and challenges regarding CPD member retention and provide strategic direction to address gangs and crime in the city.”
When someone puts something in paragraph one, you ought to pay attention to the relevance of that particular item. Take this article’s first paragraph as an example.
The second instance of the word appears in the document’s table of contents on page 4.
KEY FINDINGS
The word leadership next appears a total of eight times throughout the report’s “Key Findings” section — which is fairly relevant, as the section’s title is self-explanatory.
Key Finding #1
The first instance in Key Finding #1 describes how officers of the department have “showed impressive and admirable leadership, loyalty and dedication to the ideals of policing, the department and the community.” This does not reference the department’s staff leading its troops, but rather how the officers of the department — the troops themselves — have displayed leadership to our community.
Key Finding #4
That point is quickly backed-up by the next four instances of the word in Key Finding #4, stating:
“Low morale exists at CPD due in part because of current leadership and management issues. Although a number of social factors, including recent high-profile police incidents, make serving as a Chief of Police almost anywhere in the nation today one of the most stressful, demanding and, often, thankless jobs, it is both an honor and a challenge to lead a police department in efforts to protect a community. As such, it is imperative leaders of police departments possess strong leadership skills and the ability to interact and communicate with individuals within a department and in the community to be successful. Based upon numerous interviews our team members conducted, we found there is significant consensus among people within and outside the department that substantial attention needs to be given to addressing current leadership and management issues at CPD. The very low morale that currently exists at CPD is due in large part to these issues, which in turn has impacted CPD operations and the agency’s ability to attract and retain officers. As well-intentioned as current leadership efforts are, and as honorable as those providing these services are, this is a critical area that needs to be addressed.”
In short: the current chief of police does not possess leadership skills, it has detrimentally impacted morale, and the department has to correct this if it wants to move forward.
Key Finding #10
The word leadership appears another two times in Key Finding #10, drawing attention to the department’s lack of leadership training; it has fostered an environment that has allowed incompetency to rise to the top without bothering to consider the difference between technical skills and martial leadership ability, otherwise known as the “Peter Principle”:
“The CPD has not developed its own formal mentorship or leadership development program, nor does it consistently adhere to a formal supervisory training program for new or existing supervisors. Career and leadership development programs are important to department members and can contribute to their effectiveness and increased retention. First-line supervisors are the backbone of any police department’s patrol operations and should be afforded the opportunity to participate in training to enhance their skills.”
Key Finding #16
The word appears again in Key Finding #16, stating that the city and the department may seek to utilize the leadership and strategic development expertise of members of our community to improve the department’s situation:
“This assessment was funded by a group of leading Columbus business(es). They were concerned about, among other things, rising crime rates and retention of Columbus Police Department members. They expressed interest in supporting initiatives which help to improve the Columbus Police Department and reduce overall crime within the city. This provides an opportunity for the city and the police department to partner with these businesses to take advantage of private industry’s expertise in leadership, strategy development and effective use of technology.”
On that note, we therefore offer the same professional insight this key finding discusses by reiterating what we have published just last week on the topic: You cannot hire a “Tony Robbins wannabe” for a week to all-of-a-sudden implant a career’s-worth of martial leadership experience into a man charged with leading a literal police department — especially after that individual has not only eroded the trust and confidence of his own officers for years, but has also chosen to defend his own failures in front of them to this very day. No one will follow him — and they would be just in their decision not to.
DEPARTMENT MANAGEMENT
The next instance of the word leadership appears in the Department Management section of the report on page 26, which specifically discusses how Chief Blackmon does not trust his own subordinate supervisors to perform their jobs, and thus he himself dangerously intervenes; his micromanagement has been so severe that it has caused a danger to his officers in the field while conducting criminal investigations:
“Some command staff noted they do not have the authority to assign or transfer personnel into and out of their divisions or the ability to make decisions to run their bureaus or units. They note the chief is seemingly involved in everything, much of which department personnel believe could be adequately handled by the respective supervisor. We encourage the chief not only to embrace the leadership value of extending trust and autonomy, but also realize the value of maintaining a safe distance and allowing his commanders to provide a layer of protection for him. For example, we learned of an instance in which the police chief was observed going door to door seeking video footage of an officer-involved shooting even before the Georgia Bureau of Investigation arrived at the scene. Such actions, while undermining the trust in his commanders, introduce risk to the chief, in that he created a situation where he has assumed complete responsibility for the incident. Observers noted that was not the proper role of the chief.”
INTERNAL COMMUNICATION AND LEADERSHIP
This is the only section of the report that is specifically intended to discuss the department’s leadership. Every other instance of the word throughout the report is because the crux of the items within other sections have been traced back to leadership failures.
The word is mentioned a total of 11 times within this leadership section of the report. We’ll highlight the sentences that contain the word for brevity, using ellipsis to tie together the lengthy section:
“Internal communication and leadership: Serving as a Chief of Police is one of the toughest jobs that exists, particularly today given the ongoing criticism that many are directing at law enforcement agencies and their leaders across the country. Yet one who takes on the mantle of leading a law enforcement agency is rightfully expected to tackle day-to-day challenges with confident leadership and vigor, as that is what is expected by both a department’s rank-and-file members as well as by the myriad community stakeholders and residents the chief and department serve … As such, in the following paragraphs, it is not our intent to be hypercritical about CPD leadership, particularly given the challenges that come with leading a police department; rather, it is our intent to highlight what we learned during our work at CPD and surface issues of concern so that current CPD leadership is aware of the criticisms and can take direct action to address them so the department may move forward. Doing so will be critical if the agency is to address many of the recruiting, hiring and retention challenges CPD is currently experiencing. Both internal communication and leadership were common themes that surfaced throughout our many interviews. During our assessment, we had opportunities to speak with personnel throughout the department of all ranks, races, genders, ages, tenures and assignments as well as observe some internal CPD functions, such as the Office of the Month Award ceremony … Consistent with the sentiment of our many interviewees, while pay compression was a concern, it was secondary to poor morale – the perceived result of micromanagement in leadership … This lack of fundamental leadership was frequently voiced in interviews with department personnel and reiterated by community members and leaders who expect their chief to provide direction and vision … Officers interviewed voiced concerns about this lack of leadership, in failing to communicate and when doing so, a lack of transparency. Officers expressed concerns that in public settings the chief is not transparent with the public and they witness the public’s frustration. Officers told our team about instances where the public was asking what they could do to help, and the chief declined assistance. While officers we spoke with repeatedly stated they rarely hear from the chief, what they have heard is “community policing;” as such, the officers question why the chief does not accept input or assistance offered by the community and are quick to point out he does not accept input or assistance from within his own department either.”
It is important to note that the report specifically mentions the outstanding leadership demonstrated by first-line supervisors within the department, both by sergeants and within the rank-and-file themselves:
“Just as we heard about the leadership that exists among some of the command staff, we witnessed first line supervisors exhibiting leadership. We spoke with and witnessed sergeants who embrace their role and understand the importance a first-line supervisor plays in forming the future of the department. The leadership, loyalty and dedication among the rank and file when faced with such adversity was both impressive and admirable.”
The troops and their non-commissioned officers — their sergeants — know what “right” looks like — and the report specifically mentions that it isn't coming from the chief.
RECOMMENDATIONS ON ORG STRUCTURE, MANAGEMENT, POLICIES, & PRACTICES
The word appears an additional 5 times within the recommendations table of the Organizational Structure, Management, Policies, and Practices section on page 31 of the report.
Recommendation 1.4
“The department should consider engaging department members in revising the CPD’s mission statements to ensure consistency of the mission and to reflect the importance of the community. This will also assist the department in improving its efforts to implement internal procedural justice and providing an opportunity to enhance communications between department leadership and the rank and file.”
Recommendation 1.5
“The department should develop a formal internal communications strategy that would outline how, when, and where department leadership will provide information to all members of the department on the department’s mission, strategy and vision, as well as when significant policy or organizational changes are being implemented. The plan should also outline the steps rank and file members of the department may use to make recommendations and provide suggestions to CPD leadership.”
Recommendation 1.7
“Consider providing a mentoring program for CPD leadership that provides an opportunity for those leading the department to receive input from external peers and/or law enforcement professionals to help guide them in their responsibilities. Consideration should also be given to taking advantage of the leadership expertise that exists within the Columbus community itself to help expand and develop CPD management.” (Our professional recommendation: the trust of the troops is already gone; two years of negligent “mulligans” have caused too much irreparable damage already; seek a broadening reassignment for the current commander to expand his own leadership ability in a controlled environment elsewhere and not in a live department.)
RETENTION OF DEPARTMENT MEMBERS
A notable place to look for why officers have continued to leave the department is in their exit interviews. Oddly enough (sarcasm emphasized), these officers have continued to name Chief Blackmon’s lack of leadership ability as the reason they have resigned — though they weren’t captured in exit interviews, because Blackmon’s department stopped conducting them after he was continuously named as the reason.
The number of total departures within Chief Blackmon’s first year as chief had risen from 62 officers to 99 officers — a 60% increase — while the rest of the nation only saw an 18% increase in officer resignations that same year; officers were leaving CPD under Blackmon’s leadership at a rate 3.33 times faster than the national average.
Exit Interviews
On page 54 of the report, Blackmon is specifically called out on his lack of exit interviews by stating that CPD absolutely should be soliciting and assessing the bonafide opinions of the hundreds of officers who have named Blackmon as the reason for their resignations:
“To elicit honest and open feedback from employees, many departments have employees complete the form anonymously, without identifying themselves by name on the form. When lists of subjects or categories are provided to be rated, the ratings should be located on the form after the open-ended questions that seek information on the employee’s reason for leaving. The lists of categories to be rated may include additional categories helpful to recruitment, retention, supervision, management and leadership of the department, such as questions soliciting information about mission, culture, morale, equipment and leadership.”
Fraternal Order of Police Survey
As we published yesterday in part four of this six-part series, the Fraternal Order of Police conducted a survey of 232 of its CPD members after growing extremely concerned for the state of the department and the safety of both CPD officers and the city of Columbus itself. The concern was due to the complete lack of action from city officials to even acknowledge that such serious leadership problems existed with Chief Blackmon, let alone take action to see that they were corrected.
Jensen Hughes included that study on page 54 of the report, saying:
“Another source of information about job satisfaction for organizations is organized labor. On February 22, 2022, The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) Lodge 9 released a statement that it conducted a survey of its 232 members who are CPD officers. The FOP indicated this comprised over 73% of the entire CPD staff. According to the FOP, 99.5% of respondents do not believe department staffing is sufficient to provide a proper level of police services to citizens nor adequate backup for officer safety. Additionally, 95.8% thought the release of suspects from jail on Own Recognizance bonds and Principal’s Summons has contributed to increased crime. Meanwhile, 95.8% thought CPD has become more reactive than proactive under current leadership, and 94.7% of those respondents thought this contributed to the increase in crime. Among other findings, 93% thought there is not good communication between the Chief’s Office and the rest of the department. When asked if they had confidence in the chief to lead CPD in a manner that provides for fair treatment of officers, officer safety and reduced crime in the city, 84% of the respondents answered no. According to the FOP, 26% of its voting members are people of color and 65% of them voted they did not have confidence in the chief. On March 1, 2022, the FOP discussed the survey results and other issues with the Columbus City Council and Mayor Skip Henderson.”
Employee Feedback & Surveys
The word leadership is then mentioned again on the very next page of the report in a section discussing the feedback received by the specially-formed internal retention committee we discussed in part 3 of this six-part series.
A key point emphasized by Jensen Hughes in this report is that in conducting the retention study in 2022, “employees were asked what the department could do to retain employees and what issues were causing employees to depart. Some of the employees contacted responded they would not participate because they believed nothing would come of the effort.”
Before the findings are even counted and assessed, the fact that officers do not even think their input would matter is a very large indicator of an absolutely atrocious command climate. We cannot underscore this enough.
The findings of that retention committee — which Blackmon disbanded after the results contradicted previous decisions he had made on how to lead the department — are expressed by Jensen Hughes as such:
“The three main issues identified by employees as contributing to the departure of department personnel and in need of urgent attention were: Poor leadership and micromanagement by the chief; Pay and pay compression; and Retirement benefits. An array of other complaints, concerns and suggestions were received, to include: Unfair promotion policy; Poor communications by leadership; …” (several other items listed; limited here for brevity)
The word leadership appears again on page 56, stating that several other smaller and inconsequential items were also identified — though poor leadership was again emphasized by Jensen Hughes as being the single-most damaging factor:
“A few of the employees we interviewed said the retention pendulum is shifting with advances of the pay study, as well as efforts by the chief to adjust policies as a result of the feedback from the retention committee regarding facial hair, tattoos and changes in uniforms. [etc.] However, most interviewees said policies on facial hair, tattoos and uniforms are superficial and do not address the primary issue of poor leadership.”
Interview & Observations
The report continues by discussing how retention was identified as a “critical issue for the department and its mission,” going on to state:
“The three primary reasons personnel cited to us as causing officers to leave the department were poor leadership, micromanagement from the top and issues related to pay. Most of those interviewed stressed poor leadership impacted employee morale and was the primary reason for departures. Many employees described to us an environment where all significant operational and personnel decisions in the department are made by the chief, or one or two confidants, resulting in indecision or untimely delayed responses that create uncertainty and impede the ordinary course of operations … While employees identified one to three senior commanders who they highly respect and trust, most employees believe the department’s senior leadership routinely demonstrates an inability to function together as one united team.”
Best Practices
Within the section’s paragraphs on “Best Practices,” Jensen Hughes again reiterates the importance of focusing on leadership:
“Focusing on management and leadership in law enforcement agencies is important. Departments should ensure performance reviews take management skills into account … We found that expressed concerns about what many believe is poor leadership and micromanagement at the Columbus Police Department is one of the main reasons employees are leaving the department. This is consistent with the findings of Columbus State University’s SWOT analysis of the CPD, conducted in 2021, which found that in addition to pay compression and low salary, the lack of respect/fear of retaliation, lack of leadership and micromanagement were expressed as top weaknesses of the department. The department does not have a structured leadership development program, although the corporal position may somewhat prepare officers for supervision roles. One of the results may be assignments to senior and mid-level leadership positions do not appear to be aligned with skill sets.”
But don’t worry, guys. City Manager Isaiah Hugley already told us this is just all because of racism. (You clown, Hugley. You utter clown. Shame on you.)
RECOMMENDATIONS ON RETENTION
The recommendations table of this section of the report again mentions the word leadership two more times:
Recommendation 4.4
“Create leadership development and career development plans to provide department members and potential lateral transfers to the department clear career advancement opportunities, such as promotions or assignments and transfers.”
Recommendation 4.5
“Establish a formal advisory group within the department, consisting of members representing all ranks and units, to elevate its members’ perspectives, experiences, and opinions to command staff and city leadership.”
PROMOTIONS
The Promotions section of the report mentioned the word leadership a total of four additional times: thrice in its body text, and once in its recommendations table.
The report speaks of the lack of transparency Chief Blackmon has exhibited in his selection and assignment of certain personnel to certain positions within the department:
“Several of CPD’s supervisory and leadership positions are subject to appointment by the chief and include the position of corporal, deputy chief and assistant chiefs … Having department policy on assignments and transfers provides guidance to leadership and transparency to personnel on the processes. The CPD does not have a policy specific to assignment, rotation and transfer procedures or processes. Many of the personnel we spoke with said senior and mid-level leadership positions do not appear to be aligned with skill sets, and the department makes frequent reassignments that are not always consistent with perceived strengths and weaknesses of personnel. Some said transfers occurred without any advance communications to the bureau, division or unit commanders and supervisors or to the transferred employee. Some said they felt their own transfer was made just to show them the chief or command staff “can do what they want.” Some also expressed concerns that transfers are not being used as part of strategic succession planning in divisions and units where the sole person with a specialized skill set, required certification or expert knowledge is expected to retire or leave the department soon.”
We’re going to allow the reader to form their own conclusions on what that body of text appears to tyrannically and nepotistically imply.
Recommendations
The Recommendations table of the “Promotions” section on page 65 of the report also contains an instance of the word leadership in Recommendation 5.5:
“To comply with GO 4-3.6, develop an ongoing training program for supervisory and command staff members to continue developing their supervisory and leadership skills. Such training should include skills such as leading, directing, mentoring and disciplining direct subordinates.”
Are we understanding the general vibe Jensen Hughes is getting at yet?
ACCOUNTABILITY
The report’s “Accountability” section contains an additional three instances of the word leadership, beginning on page 65 with a discussion of ill-practiced and heavy-handed disciplinary action from the department’s leadership to its officers:
“Effective management of complaints about Department personnel and the internal affairs investigative process helps hold personnel accountable, delivers procedural justice to employees and increases public trust and confidence. Conversely when mishandled, the disciplinary process may become a source of conflict between Department leadership and labor, and a source of mistrust between the Department and the community it serves.”
Another instance is found on page 67, discussing how citizen complaints are not being recorded into a central database until after Chief Blackmon has personally signed-off on it, which is a complete violation of department policy under Order 2-6:
“Order 2-6 requires all completed complaint reports and documentation be forwarded to OPS to be recorded into a database and a file created. We observed incoming citizen complaints are not recorded into a centralized database until after the involved bureau has investigated the complaint, the bureau commander has reviewed it, and it has been forwarded to the chief for review. The common practice within most law enforcement agencies is to record and track complaints from the time they are initially received. This practice gives greater visibility to OPS and department leadership on trends, patterns or issues regarding complaints, as well as help to make sure complaints are tracked through a formal system and are completed in a timelier manner.”
Early Intervention System
The word also turns up in a single paragraph on page 75 discussing the department’s implementation of an early intervention system to “identify and provide support and guidance to officers whose performance may be suffering because of personal or professional challenges.” Currently, the department’s EIS focuses on the outcome of the perceived at-risk behavior instead of on its occurrence. Jensen Hughes provides a specific recommendation for how all leaders within the department should be better-instructed by the department’s senior leadership on how to implement this EIS system, implying that Blackmon’s leadership has failed to ensure this:
“Ensure first-line supervisors are trained on the EIS, understand their leadership role in using the system to address problems in a positive and productive manner, and to proactively identify potential at-risk behavior in their subordinates.”
TECHNOLOGY & USE OF DATA
The word leadership appeared seven additional times in the Technology & Use of Data” section of the report, beginning on page 83 while discussing the department’s management information system.
It is imperative for the reader to understand that this exact sort of crime data management was exactly what chief Blackmon was personally responsible for before he became chief; this is supposed to be his bread and butter, and the department has completely and utterly dropped the proverbial ball on this under his command as chief.
The report describes an example of such ball-dropping as follows:
“During department interviews, we learned a drive-by shooting of an occupied residence when nobody was struck or injured has sometimes been captured by the department as a single aggravated assault and other times it is captured as a multiple of the number of occupants at the time of the incident. So, if there were six occupants, it was recorded as six aggravated assaults. In 2021, drive-by shootings of an unoccupied residence were being captured by patrol as aggravated assaults. By 2022, Department leadership directed shootings of unoccupied residences instead be captured as criminal damage to property. It is evident that simply comparing the number of aggravated assaults from 2021 with 2022 by month, without an analysis that controls for the change in definition of what constitutes and does not constitute an aggravated assault, would lead to wrong conclusions and misinformed resource allocation and enforcement strategy decisions, based on inaccurate data. It would lead to incorrect assumptions that aggravated assaults have gone down when they did not.”
CompStat
The word leadership also appears on page 86 in the report’s paragraphs discussing CompStat, which is an information system heavily relied on in policing to identify crime patterns and trends so that departments can make quick, accurate, and effective decisions on how they should implement policing tactics to combat crime in an area.
Again, this is supposed to be Chief Blackmon’s bread and butter, yet his lack of leadership has enabled the department to drop the ball on this under his command.
If you are wondering why violent crime has continued to not be challenged in any sort of an effective, cohesive, and strategic manner, this is why. We cannot underscore this enough:
“Regular occurring CompStat meetings are held by departments where leadership discuss and analyze crime problems, strategies used to address them and what the results are to date. Used as intended, these meetings are performance management systems that strategically solve problems … We observed one of the department’s monthly CompStat meetings. It was not as effective or efficient as it could have been. The chief did not run the meeting and was minimally engaged. The captains who were called on were not questioned in any significant ways about the problems in their areas, and most command staff appeared minimally engaged. There was little to no effort by commanders or the presenters to integrate any enforcement or investigative efforts with the crime data presented, and commanders did not use this time to highlight the work efforts of their respective sections.”
Integrated Case Management:
The word is found again on page 88 while discussing integrated case management: the way in which information is shared between different bureaus and cases within the department to provide officers with near-real time information so they can find connections and make the best decisions possible Currently, the department is using individual, stand-alone spreadsheets that are being manually updated anytime there is new information; this is insane, especially given the plethora of centralized link analysis software currently available — some of it for freakin’ free — that could be used to decompartmentalize this critical data instead. Again, this sort of systems and data management was supposed to be Blackmon’s bread and butter, yet the department continues to suffer in this modern and digital age.
Jensen Hughes makes this point:
“Case management and data integration was identified as a pain point by many of the officers, detectives, supervisors and commanders we interviewed … We also found supervisors of various divisions and units within the Bureau of Investigations also use stand-alone Excel spreadsheets to accomplish some case tracking and review functions. Active homicide investigations are tracked using separately maintained stand-alone Excel spreadsheets maintained by the commanders of the Homicide Division and Bureau of Investigations, and some department leadership. Each time another homicide occurs, new data is being manually added separately to update each individual spreadsheet, and reportedly added to reference books for some members of the command staff. Similarly, the Youth and Adult Services Unit utilizes Excel spreadsheets to track missing persons investigations. We also observed these homegrown standalone spreadsheets being used by the Office of Professional Standards (context: where Blackmon came from) for their own case tracking functions. This dependence on Excel spreadsheets inhibits the department’s ability to document and query case information or manage information effectively and efficiently. We learned the Bureau of Investigation leadership reviews pending cases in a face-to-face meeting as opposed to leveraging a comprehensive and automated case management system. This manual process depends on the involved commanders’ institutional knowledge, availability and accessibility. We acknowledge the current leadership says this process works for them (context: but not for the department, which is a leadership failure); however, the department is encouraged to look at the efficiencies of implementing an electronic tracking system for more timely and organized case updates and real-time identification of open cases for them and their successors. The need for fully integrated case management is not new and has been identified by department leadership as a critical department need for at least the past 15 years … The department’s Needs Assessment Critical Needs 2011-2014 document identified an integrated case management system as “critical to the operations of the department.” It noted the project has been on the “drawing board” for over fifteen years, and is critical to effective services to the public, managing resources and information and enhancing communication. The request was a continued request from the 2007 Strategic Action Plan. We acknowledge the challenges of the current
So in short: Blackmon denied the department the ability to have a modern centralized database system for integrated case management from before the time he was even appointed as chief, because the current antiquated system “worked for him,” even though it had been identified as “critical to the operations of the department.”
How many people have died as a result of this insane gross negligence, both while Blackmon was running the Office of Professional Standards, and while he has been chief? This is negligence. It should be formally investigated.
POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND PROTOCOLS TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS CRIMINAL GANG ACTIVITY
The word leadership makes several appearances in the report’s section on gangs, beginning on page 101 of the report, though several of them refer to the leadership of the gangs themselves. However, the context of the paragraphs do in fact draw direct attention to failures of Blackmon’s leadership during his time as chief — specifically, his gutting of the Special Operations Unit to make up for the patrol officers who resigned due to his lack of leadership:
“Some gang suppression plans encompass sharing gang intelligence with other law enforcement agencies and corrections organizations, targeting and apprehending serious and chronic gang crime offenders, prosecuting gang leadership, utilizing enhanced sentencing provisions and prosecuting under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and conspiracy statutes … CPD does not have a specifically designated functioning gang enforcement unit, nor illegal firearms team within the department. While woefully understaffed, the single, half-time position in the Gang Analysis and Investigation unit has accomplished much and worked hard to make gangs a department priority. We found during our interviews there is not a single person or group within the department where robust knowledge and expertise on all or most of the city’s gang factions, leadership, members, areas of influence and criminal activities exists. We did identify some personnel who had individual expertise on a specific gang, gang faction or gang area of operation due to their work on a specific criminal investigation or assignment.”
APPENDIX A: STAFFING STUDY OF THE COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT
Appendix A of the report contains additional information on Jensen Hughes’ staffing study of the department. The word leadership makes its final appearance in the “Authorized Level Approach” paragraphs of the appendix, discussing how some police departments may base their staffing allocations on the amount of funded positions provided to them by their budget: the “authorized level”of staffing.
The Columbus police department was funded to support a total of 488 sworn officers in 2008 when the city had a population of only 180,000 people. As of 2022, the city’s population was at an estimated 206,000 people, implying that the city should now have even more officers than had been allocated in 2008.
Using that same 2008 ratio of 2.71 officers per 1,000 residents, the Columbus Police Department should now have a total of 558 sworn police officers in its ranks. Instead, the department has an estimated 290 as of the date of this article's publication on Feb. 23, 2023.
By that same ratio dictating 558 officers, the department is only 52% staffed; it is missing one out of every two officers our city requires to keep our city safe.
“The authorized level can become an artificial benchmark for need, creating the misperception among police leadership, line staff and the community that the agency is understaffed and overworked if the actual number of officers does not meet the authorized level. Additionally, unless an agency staffs above the authorized level, fluctuations in recruitment, selection, training and attrition may lead to the actual staffing levels falling below authorized levels. Because the authorized level is often derived independently of workload considerations, an agency may be able to meet workforce demand with fewer officers than authorized. Still, the perception of being understaffed, resulting when officials bemoan the department operating below authorized strength, can diminish morale and productivity, and make it appear the community is not adequately funding public safety.”
Columbus is currently “authorized” 488 sworn officers. It should actually be authorized 558.
Two nights ago, there were a mere ELEVEN total officers patrolling the entire city from 10 p.m. until 6 a.m.
We’ll leave it to the reader to decide whether having only ELEVEN officers patrol the 26 beats our city requires is acceptable.
Perhaps our city’s officials should seriously take that into consideration.
Be sure to stay with us for the final part of this six-part series on The CPD Files: The Four Leaked Documents That Show CPD’s Leadership Failures.
Facts are stubborn things — and we’ll keep publishing them, whether city officials like them or not.
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